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Cooper v. State, 134 Nev. 52 (July 26, 2018) (en banc)1
CRIMINAL APPEAL: PROBATION
Summary
The Court invoked its supervisory powers and adopted a rule of admissibility to limit the
use of a probationer’s testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
Background
In March 2014, Kamesha Cooper was placed on probation. In July 2016, she was
arrested and a criminal complaint was filed alleging possession of false identification and
concealment or destruction of evidence in the commission of a felony. The charges were later
dismissed because the State needed time to investigate the case.
The Division of Parole and Probation filed two reports alleging probation violations. At
the revocation hearing, Cooper’s counsel requested that the district court not allow testimony
related to the arrest because Cooper would be placed in a position of having to choose between
presenting mitigating evidence at the revocation hearing and incriminating herself regarding the
potential charges. The district court acknowledged that Cooper would be prejudiced, but allowed
testimony from the arresting officer and the district attorney’s office. However, Cooper did not
testify. Based on the testimony, the court revoked Cooper’s probation. This appeal followed.
Discussion
Although probationers are not afforded “the full panoply of constitutional protections,”2
the Supreme Court has held that due process at a revocation hearing requires that a probationer
be given the opportunity to be heard and to present mitigating evidence.3 The issue in the present
action concerns the tension between two important rights: the due process right to be heard and
to present mitigating evidence and the right against self-incrimination as to pending or potential
criminal charges related to the alleged probation violation.
In Dail v. State,4 this Court considered whether to allow the holding of a revocation
hearing prior to a criminal trial forced the alleged violator to make a constitutionally unfair
decision. However, the Court declined to establish a rule and deferred to the legislature. Here,
the Court affirmed the decision in Dail which stated that the tension between these two rights is
not of constitutional import. Rather, the Court found that it is one that involves public policy and
fairness.
After considering the various interests involved, the Court determined that these interests
are undermined when a probationer is deterred from testifying at their own revocation hearing.
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Further, the Court noted that the prosecution in a criminal trial has the burden of presenting
sufficient evidence and it must be met before the defendant decides whether to testify. The
prosecution’s burden is lessened if it is allowed to take advantage of a defendant’s testimony at
an earlier revocation hearing.
“Basic fairness demands that a defendant must not be forced to forfeit one constitutional
right to preserve another constitutional right.”5 Although this unfairness does not rise to the level
of constitutional deprivation, it is still substantial and necessitates action by the Court on public
policy grounds. As such, the Court invoked its inherent supervisory power to adopt a rule to limit
the use of a probationer’s testimony given at a probation revocation hearing. However, the Court
noted an exception for purposes of impeachment in cases where the probationer’s revocation
hearing testimony and the testimony on direct examination are clearly inconsistent and warrant
admission of the revocation hearing testimony. The Court further emphasized that this rule is
limited to testimony about the crime at issue.
In the instant case, Cooper acknowledged that she had been advised by her counsel not to
testify regarding the circumstances of her arrest and that she felt could not proceed defending her
actions without risking her right against self-incrimination. The district court recognized it
proceeded despite the predicament before Cooper.
Conclusion
The Court reversed the order revoking probation and remanded the matter to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Dissent
The court’s “supervisory powers” do not authorize it to promulgate exclusionary rules that are
not statutorily or constitutionally based
NRS 48.025(1),6 which allows all relevant evidence to be admitted, is limited either by
the Nevada Evidence Code or by the Constitution of the United States or the State of Nevada.
Here, the Court invoked supervisory powers to adopt this new exclusionary rule. However,
without a basis in statute or the constitution, the new rule conflicts with NRS 48.025(1).
The new exclusionary rule the majority announces will not advance Cooper’s cause, as her
failure to request such relief in district court confirms
In district court, Cooper asked to postpone the revocation hearing rather than asking the
court to let her testify without admitting that testimony in her future criminal proceedings.
However, the conduct that led to her arrest crossed state lines, from California, to Nevada, to
Utah, and even involved Homeland Security. As such, to reverse and remand would not protect
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Cooper from non-Nevada charges she potentially faces. Therefore, this issue should be deemed
waived.
Dail has not proved unworkable
This decision overrules Dail v. State without satisfying the requirements by stare decisis
to overrule existing law. In Dail, this Court held that it was for the legislature to decide whether
public policy supported adoption of an exclusionary rule. As such, to overrule that decision, it
must be shown that compelling, weighty, or conclusive reasons exist for overruling it. Here, the
Court fails to meet this burden, thus the case should be affirmed.
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